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Throw 'Em to the Lions (Or Bengals):
The Decline and Fall of Sports Civilization As Seen Through the Eyes of a
United States District Court
Harvey L. Zuckman*
One can almost visualize the scene. The college football coach is giving a pep
talk and he concludes with the immortal cliche, "Now, go out there and win one for
Old Winsockie." But the context is untraditional. The pep talk is not taking place in
the team locker room but on the courthouse steps and the coach is not talking to the
star quarterback but rather to the star personal injury lawyer retained by the
university.
This hypothetical scene could become commonplace given the rising curve of
violence in sports at all levels and the increasing concern for the adequacy of the
safety equipment issued to the players. But even should the number of law suits
brought by participants in intercollegiate team sports increase, it may not follow
that their colleges and universities will suffer increased liability.
There is an all too pervasive view abroad in the land that team sports are
sacrosanct and are not and should not be subject to the normal processes of the civil
law. I The basic argument is that only the internal administrators have the expertise
to determine the acceptability or reasonableness of particular contact between
players and the scope of the players' consent to contact and the risks that they
assume.2 A more emotional argument but one that must not be underestimated is
that team sports are so much a part of American life that they should enjoy a special
status apart from those workaday activities subject to the strictures of tort law.3
This laissez faire approach to team sports is exemplified by the recent decision
of a United States District Court in Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc. 4 There, in a
diversity action filed by a former professional football player, the player charged the
corporate owner of the Cincinnati franchise in the National Football League and a
Cincinnati player, Charles "Booby" Clark, with, inter alia, either negligently or
recklessly inflicting serious physical injuries upon him during the course of a
regularly scheduled NFL game.
The incident which gave rise to the tort action occurred near the end of the first
half of the game. Plaintiff Hackbart was playing a free safety position on the Denver
* A.B. 1956, Univ. of Southern California. LL.B. 1959, New York Univ. Professor of Law, Catholic Univ.
For instance, former California Superintendent 3 Id. at 788. To Americanize a famous British
of Public Instruction, Max Rafferty is reported as dictum, "World War II was won on the playing fields of
saying, "There are two great national institutions which Harvard and Yale." The unspoken premise of this
simply cannot tolerate either internal dissension or dictum is that team sports at all levels are too important
external interference: our Armed Forces and our to be left to the courts to control.
sports programs." Slusher, Sport: A Philosophical 4 435 F. Supp. 352 (D. Colo. 1977), noted in Note,
Perspective, 38 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 129 (1973). 10 CONN. L. REV. 365 (1978).
2 See Comment, Violence in Professional Sports,
1975 Wis. L. REV. 771, 784.
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Broncos' defensive team and Charles Clark was playing fullback on the Cincinnati
Bengals' offensive team. The Bengals attempted a forward pass play during which
Clark, a potential receiver, ran into a corner of the end zone which was defended by
Hackbart. The pass was intercepted near the goal line by a Broncos' linebacker who
began to run upfield toward the Bengals' goal line. As a result of an attempt to block
out Clark during the interception play, Hackbart fell to the ground. He then turned
his body to face upfield with one knee on the ground in order to watch the action.
Clark, "[a]cting out of anger and frustration, but without a specific intent to
injure," 5 struck a blow with his right forearm to the back of the kneeling plaintiff's
head with sufficient force to cause both players to fall forward to the ground.
No official observed this obvious infraction of the rules and so no penalty was
imposed for the personal foul. Hackbart made no report of the incident during the
remainder of the game. Following the contest he experienced considerable pain and
soreness but continued to play two more games for the Broncos before being
released on waivers. He was not claimed by any other team. Thereafter, he sought
medical treatment, and it was then discovered that he had a neck injury. These facts
were found by the trial court acting as trier of the facts. On these facts the District
Court entered judgment for both the corporate and individual defendants.
The court reasoned that given the well-documented conditioning of the players
by their coaches to be heedless of injury to themselves in seeking victory for their
teams, "[t]he character of NFL competition negates any notion that the playing
conduct can be circumscribed by any standard of reasonableness." 6 This, of course,
means that no prima facie case in tort for negligence or reckless misconduct can be
made out when physical misconduct occurs in the context of a professional football
game.
Alternatively, the court ruled that even if the defendant Clark could be held to
breach a duty of due care owed to the plaintiff, there could be no recovery because of
his assumption of the risk.7 The court reasoned that "the level of violence and the
frequency of emotional outbursts in NFL football games are such that [the plaintiff]
must have recognized and accepted the risk that he would be injured by such an act
as that committed by the defendant Clark ... 8
Regarding possible direct liability of the defendant Cincinnati Bengals, Inc.
based on plaintiff's theory that the Bengals failed to instruct and control their
fullback, the court pointed to the record in the case which reflected that what Clark
did was "an example of the excesses of violence which have become expectable as a
result of the style of play in the NFL."9 And, of course, since a successful action in
5 Id. at 353. players to conform to the rules and regulations of the
6 Id. at 356. NFL; that there was no tortious interference with
7 Id. plaintiffs existing contractual rights; and that defend-
8 Id. In response to certain other theories of ant Clark was not guilty of the tort of outrageous
liability put forward by the plaintiff, the District Court conduct resulting in severe emotional distress as defined
ruled that plaintiff was not a third party beneficiary of in Section 46, Restatement of Torts, 2d.
the NFL standard player contract provision requiring 9 435 F. Supp. at 357.
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tort would not lie against the Bengals' servant Clark, there could be no vicarious
liability.
Beyond the narrow issues of tort law considered in Hackbart, the District
Court addressed itself to the broader social policy question whether the courts
should intervene to control violence on the professional playing field. In answering
this question in the negative, the court relied on that well-worn concept that there
are some areas of human activity the judiciary is not well suited to control. In
support of judicial restraint here the court pointed out that there is no discernible
code of conduct for NFL players. "The NFL has substituted the morality of the
battlefield for that of the playing field, and the 'restraints of civilization' have been
left on the sidelines." I0 Under these circumstances the difference between legally
acceptable contact and legally unacceptable contact would be incapable of
articulation.
Then, too, according to the court, the question of causation would be
extremely difficult in view of the frequency of forceful collisions; the courts would be
faced with voluminous litigation; the nature of NFL football might be forced to
change because of judicial intervention; and, finally, if there is to be governmental
intervention it should be by the legislative branch. Exit the courts!
There are many things that can be said about this decision-nearly all of them
bad. First, it is a shame that the case could not have been tried on an intentional tort
theory."I If it had been, the District Court might have been harder pressed to declare
NFL players and teams immune from tort liability to other players. While the court
emphasized that the defendant Clark had no specific intent to injure, such intent is
not required for the torts of battery and assault.' 2 All that is required is an intent to
physically invade another's bodily security.' 3 Clearly, Clark did intend such an
invasion with his contact to the back of Hackbart's head.
The two critical issues which would have had to be resolved if an action for
battery had been brought are the scope of Hackbart's consent to physical contact
within the context of the game of football and the policy question whether a player's
person should receive any protection of tort law against personal attacks during the
progress of a contact sport. On the first issue, Hackbart produced several fellow
players as witnesses who denounced Clark's conduct as unacceptable. It seems
highly unlikely, then, that Hackart or any other player can be found, as a matter of
fact, to consent to such egregious violations of the rules particularly when they are
out of the play. On the second issue, Hackbart would again have faced the question
whether the court would be willing to extend protection to football players in the
0 Id. at 358 team player who struck him and knocked him uncon-
I The statute of limitations had run on any claim scious).
of intentional torts, i.e., battery and possibly assault. Id. 12 See, e.g. Vosburg . Pumney, 80 Wis. 428, 50
at 355. For an example of an intentional tort action, see N. W. 403 (1891).
Griggas . Clause, 6 Il. App. 2d 412, 128 N.E.2d 363 '' See W. Prosser, HADBOOK OF THE LAW OF
(1955) (center on amateur basketball team awarded TOR 31 (4th ed. 1971).
verdict in assault and battery action against opposing
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course of the game. Given the court's discussion of social policy regarding the
negligence and reckless misconduct theories, one could conclude that no extension
would be made even under the intentional tort theory. But the denial of tort
protection against intentional misconduct is the most difficult to justify and would
have placed in clearer relief the extreme nature of the court's decision.
Second, it is difficult to accept the idea that there is no duty of due care on the
professional playing field in contact sports. Simply because the court views NFL
competition to be uncivilized (the same might be said for professional hockey) is no
reason to permit the carnage to continue without external attempts to control it. The
court exhibits a resigned attitude not worthy of the judiciary.14
Third, while the traditional view of the affirmative defense of assumption of
risk in negligence cases is akin to the concept of consent in intentional tort, the more
modern view is that assumption of risk must be treated as a facet of the defense of
contributory negligence.15 This modern view requires the trier of fact to determine
not only whether the plaintiff was aware of the specific risk before its realization and
whether he voluntarily confronted it but also whether the plaintiff was unreasonable
in confronting the known risk. Only if the trier of fact, normally the jury, decided
that choosing to earn one's living by playing the risky game of football was
unreasonable would the player be barred from recovery.
As a matter of social policy, treating assumption of risk as a facet of
contributory negligence seems sound. The law, in an effort to give more protection
to the worker, has moved away from the idea prevalent between the Civil War and
World War I that a worker simply takes his or her chances when he or she works
among known hazards. 16 The District Court gives no reason why this discredited
social and legal view should survive on the professional playing field.
Fourth, the court's additional supporting points are mere make-weights. Even
if the question of causation of the injury from the complained of contact is
"extremely difficult," that is plaintiff's problem once he gets to trial. But the
difficulty of the issue is no reason to deny him the opportunity to seek recovery. The
court also resorts to the "floodgate" argument and the concern that a flood of
14 The Court's attitude should be contrasted with
those of persons closer to professional sport and
concerned about its future. One such person is Joan
Ryan, sports columnist for The Washington Post and
wife of the gifted former quarterback of the Cleveland
Browns and Washington Redskins, Frank Ryan. In a
recent column decrying the growing violence in sports,
Ms. Ryan said, "I always have accepted a certain
amount of violence in football. The threat of devastat-
ing injury in this most physical of games is a nightmare
not quite clearly recalled. It wafts around the edge of
awareness. But today's athletes-more skilled, bigger,
taller and stronger-seem to accept as fundamentals
such lethal attacks as the forearm shiver, the clothesline
tackle and the vicious late hit. What was once
unintentional damage now appears cold, purposeful
and premeditated. Brutalizing the opponent is part of
the job .... [T]oday's heroes are not the kind of men I
want my sons to copy." The Washington Post, Sunday,
Dec. 25, 1977, p. F8, col. 1.
1 See, e.g., McGrath v. American Cyanamid Co.,
41 N.J.272, 196 A.2d (1963); Williamson v. Smith, 83
N.M.336, 491 P.2d 1147 (1971); James, Assumption of
Risk, 61 YALE L. J. 141 (1952); James, Assumption of
Risk: Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 YALE L. J. 185
(1968).
16 See, e.g., McGrath v. American Cvanamid
Co., 41 N.J. 272, 196 A.2d 238 (1963).
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litigation will result in disparate legal rulings in the affected states resulting in a
drastic change in the way the NFL conducts its competition. In answer, it can be said
that because of the nature of the game and its continuing relationships it is unlikely
that there would be a flood of litigation. And even if there were, is this an adequate
reason to prevent an injured person from exercising his right to seek remedy? As for
the danger of differing and conflicting rulings among the states, that is always a risk
in a union of sovereignties. Indeed, the prospect of such rulings forcing the NFL to
change its ways ought to be welcomed by the court, given its recitation on the
violence and lack of civilized behavior on the professional playing field.
The only cheering aspect of the opinion is that the court expressly limited its
decision to professional football players. "Football as a commercial enterprise is
something quite different from athletics as an extension of the academic experience
and what I have said here may have no applicability in other areas of physical
competition." 17
But then again it might. It would seem to follow from the opinion that any
sport that is rampant with commercialism and is played in a very physical and
aggressive way could legitimately seek the protection of this precedent.
Relevance of Hackbart to Colleges and Universities
Given the similarity of the rules for intercollegiate and pro football and the
colleges' similar need to win in order to fill large college stadia and defray college or
university expenses, and further, given the felt need of college players to show
aggressiveness and even abandon to be picked as high "draft choices," it might not
be remiss for university and college counsel to seek analogous protection against
suits arising out of intercollegiate football contests.
Of course, if colleges and universities, as defendants in suits brought by injured
players from rival institutions, were to argue for the applicability of the Hackbart
case, they might be impliedly conceding two important points: (1) that members of
college sports teams and particularly football teams are employees of the
educational institutions they attend, and (2) that college athletics, particularly
football, leave the restraints of civilization on the sidelines and substitute "the
morality of the battlefield for that of the playing field." 18
On the first point, there is considerable doubt whether a college player, even
one who is receiving an athletic scholarship, is a servant of the educational
institution for purposes of imposing vicarious liability in tort. Prosser has
summarized the relational test in the following way: "[I]t is probably no very
inaccurate summary of the whole matter to say that the person employed is a servant
when, in the eyes of the community, he would be regarded as a part of the employer's
own working staff, and not otherwise." 19 The idea that a college football player is a
member of the institution's work force seems farfetched and any concession of this
435 F. Supp. at 358. 11 W. Prosser. HANDBOOK OF THE I AW OF TORTS
id. 460 (4th ed. 1971).
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point should be avoided. On the second point, the very nature of the concession as to
gross incivilty is such that it ought to be avoided like the plague it is, especially in the
educational context.
If Hackbart is not an appropriate precedent for institutions of higher
education to embrace, what litigating stance should they take? It seems that the
safest position is that the college athletic conferences and the individual institutions
themselves have clear codes of conduct to govern play on the field with enforcement
safely left to the conference commissioners and college and university administra-
tors who have the requisite expertise to enforce the rules. 20 Alternatively, the
institution seeking to avoid vicarious liability for the conduct of its students on the
playing field should deny the existence of any master-servant relationship and
attempt to distinguish its athletes from its ordinary employees by establishing
substantial differences in the status of the respective groups.
But what of the possible allegations of direct liability on the part of the
institution that it failed to control its athletes properly or that it aided and abetted
their reckless or negligent conduct? Where wrongdoing is directly alleged against the
defendant institution in violation of its own or its conference's code of conduct, the
safest and most credible defense is a denial of the allegations themselves. If such
allegations cannot be disproved, then liability should follow if the conduct on the
field is beyond expectable violations of the rules.
Distinguishing Between Actionable and Non-Actionable Violations of the Rules
If Hackbart's central idea-that team contact sports which are violently played
are beyond the control of the courts-is rejected, it becomes necessary to draw a line
between contacts in violation of the rules which are actionable and contacts which
are not. Obviously some infractions of the rules resulting in contact are a normal
part of the game, such as clipping in the course of a kick return. And though such
line drawing is difficult, that is no reason not to attempt it.
The only American case to attempt this feat in the context of an organized team
sports competition is Nabozny v. Barnhill,21 in which a soccer goalkeeper in an
amateur league of high school age players was kicked in the head by an opposing
player and suffered severe skull and brain injuries while in possession of the ball in
the "penalty area." Three expert witnesses agreed that official international soccer
rules prohibit players from making contact with the goalkeeper when he is in
possession of the ball in the penalty area. Any such contact is an infraction even if
unintentional.
In reversing a directed verdict for the defendant on these facts, the Illinois
appellate court ruled that players in organized team sports owe each other some
legal duty, i.e., that a player's interest in his or her bodily integrity is entitled to some
legal protection. In so ruling the court said:
20 See Comment, note 2 supra, at 784-789. See also Comment, note 2. supra, at 774-776. These
21 31 Ill. App. 3d 212, 334 N.E. 2d 258 (1975). law review materials constitute the principle legal
The case is commented upon in Notes, 53 CHi-KFNT L. literature in this area.
RLv. 97 (1975) and 45 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 119 (1976).
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This court believes that the law should not place unreasonable
burdens on the free and vigorous participation in sports by our youth.
However, we also believe that organized, athletic competition does not
exist in a vacuum. Rather, some of the restraints of civilization must
accompany every athlete onto the playing field. One of the educational
benefits of organized athletic competition to our youth is the develop-
ment of discipline and self control. 22
Having thus ruled that a cause of action in tort might be stated in certain cases,
the court proceeded to draw the line between non-actionable and actionable
contacts on the basis of the quality of the offending person's conduct rather than on
the basis of the nature of the contact. "[A] player is liable for injury in a tort action if
his conduct is such that it is either deliberate, wilful or with a reckless disregard for
the safety of the other player so as to cause injury to that player, the same being a
question of fact to be decided by a jury."2 3 While the court did not mention the
necessity of a rule violation, it elsewhere emphasized that the contact constituted an
infraction of the international soccer rules under which the game in question was
played, and we may assume that a necessary condition for liability would be an
infringement of the rules.
Under the court's holding that athletes on the playing field are legally protected
against bodily harms that are deliberately, wilfully, or recklessly inflicted by
opposing players, it is for the plaintiff to establish the requisite state of the defendant
player's mind at the time of the harmful contact.2 4 Proving this element is not always
easy. However, the trier of fact is permitted to infer state of mind from the facts
surrounding the contact. Indeed, the resort to such inference may be the only way
for the plaintiff to establish his or her case. By emphasizing state of mind, the Illinois
court has built into the cause of action a significant limitation on liability. For if the
showing of a wrongful state of mind is required, and it can only be established from
the overt conduct of the offending player, a plaintiff is not likely to recover unless the
defendant player's conduct is not just in violation of the rules but is egregiously so.
It would seem, then, that the recognition by the Illinois court of some legal
protection for the bodily security of athletes on the playing field together with the
manner in which the cause of action was limited neatly balances the interests of the
players and the interests of those who wish to see team sports continue in much the
same way as they have in the past.
Another case imposing liability on the playing field for the injurious conduct of
a player is Bourque v. Duplechin.25 In that case a Louisiana court held that baseball
22 31 111. App. 3d at 215, 334 N.E. 2d at 260 negligently in the course of a rule violation is not
(emphasis added). actionable, the plaintiff can always embrace a theory
23 31 Ill. App. 3d at 215, 334 N.E. 2d at 261. of wanton or reckless misconduct, a theory common to
Compare Restatement of Torts 2d, §50, Comment b both Hackbart and VaboznY. But see Bourque N.
and Illustrations 4-6. Duplechin, 331 So.2d 40 (La. App. 1976), in Ahich a
2 The court did not discuss the existence of any negligence theory was used to impose liabilit\ on a
duty to avoid negligently inflicting injury on an oppos- softball player for injuring an opposing player.
ing player. This is not surprising given the facts of the 25 331 So.2d 40 (La. App. 1976).
Nabozny case. Even assuming that an injury inflicted
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and softball players are under a duty to other players to play without engaging in
unsportsmanlike conduct or wanton injurious conduct. Recognizing that baseball is
a non-contact sport, the court held a player liable for negligently inflicting injury on
an opposing player by veering substantially from the base path and using his left arm
to hit the plaintiff second baseman under the chin. 26 While the imposition of liability
here supports the argument that the trappings of civilization do follow the players
onto the playing field, the failure of the Louisiana court to consider the competing
social policies in recognizing a duty of care makes the case less than persuasive. 27
Implications of Nabozny for Colleges and Universities
Because of the Illinois court's emphasis on the educational benefits of
organized athletic competition for America's youth, and because the NaboznY case
involved amateur athletics, it is much more in point for college athletic competition
than is Hackbart. Nabozny's recognition of potential liability of the individual
college athlete could lay the foundation for the liability of the athlete's educational
institution as well. While vicarious liability through the master-servant relationship
seems unlikely, as noted above, direct liability of the institution on a theory of
negligent failure to control the individual athlete is a possibility. In addition, if there
is evidence that a college's coaching staff encourages reckless or wanton conduct on
the playing field, the coaches and the institution could be held liable on an aider and
abettor theory. 28
The basic defense to actions based on these theories is the denial of lack of
control and encouragement of deliberate, reckless, or wanton rule violations. Such a
defense will require a showing that the coaching staff makes a genuine effort to instill
in the players a respect for the rules of the sport in question and teaches techniques to
insure the safety of their players and opposing players.
Given the presence of the Nabozny precedent and the inappropriateness of the
Hackbart decision, college and university administrators and legal counsel should
26 The reader may be puzzled by the employment
of a negligence theory in the Borque case. Leaving the
basepath and smashing the second baseman under the
chin with one's arm smacks of the intentional tort of
battery and also of assault if the injured player appre-
hended the contact before it occurred. The explanation
for the negligence theory is that the offending player
was covered by liability insurance which compensated
third parties for injuries negligently inflicted by the
insured but not for injuries intentionally inflicted. A
majority of the Louisiana Court of Appeal obviously
distorted the meaning of negligence here to include the
intentional conduct of the defendant player in order to
insure plaintiffs recovery directly (Louisiana has a
direct action statute) against the defendant insurer
Allstate Insurance Company. The dissenting judge
points out the majority's analytical error and would
relieve Allstate of its liability under its contract of
insurance. The effect of the dissent would be to hold
the defendant player liable with little hope for the
plaintiff to recover much on its judgment because the
"deep pockets" defendant Allstate would be beyond
reach. For discussion of the negligence cause of action
and proving negligence, see Sports Inquiry-
Negligence, 15 PROOF OF FACTS 2d 1.
27 For other relevant case law, see Annot., Liabil-
ity of Participant in Team Athletic Competition for
Injury to or Death of Another Participant, 77 A.L.R.
3d 1300 (1977). Cf Annot., Tort Liability of Public
Schools and Public Institutions of Higher Learning for
Accident Occurring During School Athletic Events, 35
A.L.R.3d 725 (1971).
21 Cf Hudson . Craft, 33 Cal. 2d 654, 204 P.2d I
(1949); Teeters v. Frost, 145 Okla. 273, 292 P.356
(1930).
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consider conferring with the coaching staffs of their respective institutions about
safety practices on the playing field before litigation develops.
The Beginning or End of Sport as an Aspect of Civilization
The Hackbart and Nabozny cases present starkly contrasting views of what
social policy should be toward organized athletic competition. The court in
Hackbart takes an almost Hobbesian view of the sports world and would leave those
sports that are pursued in an uncivilized way to fall of their own corrupt weight or to
be legislated out of existence; supposedly, there is nothing the judiciary can do. On
the other hand, the court in Nabozny appears to believe that human institutions are
not beyond redemption and can be perfected through rational judicial intervention.
The approach taken in Nabozny is by far the more appealing for it recognizes
organized sport as an important aspect of civilization and not something apart from
it. The basic standards of civilization must be respected on the playing field as
elsewhere, according to the Illinois court. The proper social policy is for the
judiciary to exert external control through the application of basic tort law to insure
that those standards are respected.
College and university officials should welcome the latter view of organized
sports and their relationship to society, for this approach reaffirms the rational and
humanistic values to which our institutions of higher learning profess to subscribe.
If this reaffirmation subjects these institutions to potential tort liability where it may
not have existed before, this seems a small price to pay to recognize organized sports
as an important aspect in the ascendance of humankind.

